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Ohio Edison v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio1: Affirming the Charitable and 
Municipal Exception to the Policy Against  
Anti-Competitive Behavior. 
I. Introduction 
Today’s electricity user takes for granted the quick, convenient supply of electric power. 
Behind the convenience lies a variety of legal rules and regulations.2 Public utilities are 
organized as a monopoly that is heavily regulated by the state. Every consumer of 
electricity is concerned about the cost of electricity. The Public Utility Commission 
(sometimes referred to as "Commission") was given the job of guaranteeing that the price 
of electricity would be the same for all customers.3 Against this backdrop, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio has upheld a policy in Ohio Edison v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio4 
that some customers deserve special rates.5 This decision will have a negative impact on 
competition within the electric utilities' industry for municipal customers.6 
Two statutes of the Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C.") are the issue of this Note. First, 
O.R.C. §4905.33 ("Prohibition Statute") prohibits a utility from charging below cost 
service for the purpose of destroying competition.7 Directly following is O.R.C. §4905.34 
("Free Service Statute") which grants a public utility the privilege to give utility service 
for free or at a reduced charge to the government.8 Read together, one interpretation 
would conclude that the legislature gave a public utility the opportunity to charge a 
municipality free or below-cost service.9 Yet another interpretation concludes that the 
legislature intended a bar against destroying competition to include contracts between 
public utilities and municipalities.10 
This Note will analyze the effects that the Ohio Edison11 decision will have on the utility 
industry and on electric consumers.12 This Note will also explore the common law rule,13 
the background of the rule,14 and competition in the utility industries.15 This Note will 
thoroughly address the opinion and its underlying rationale.16 Finally, this Note will 
explore changes within the law and regulation necessary to bring competition to the 
public utilities industry.17 
II. Background 
A. Nature of the Utility Industry 
The utility industry was thought to be a natural monopoly.18 Generally speaking, utilities 
are unchecked by competition.19 In response to potential abuses, government enacted 
regulations to protect consumers and curb monopolistic power.20 The goal of regulation is 
to submit the utility industry to the control of market forces as well as enforce their 
obligations.21 Utilities are therefore both "Quasi-public" entities and public interest 
entities.22 Regulation is a trade off.23 The public is served, and, in exchange, the utility is 
protected from competition.24 Thus, a utility has duties to serve the public,25 and those 
duties place responsibilities upon a utility.26 As a corollary to the responsibilities, certain 
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privileges are granted.27 The most important privilege to this Note is the protection from 
competition.28 There is, thus, a public policy of protecting the utilities from 
competition.29 
B. The Common Law Rule of Free Service to Municipalities 
When the country was expanding utility service around the turn of the century, courts in 
numerous states recognized a difference between a municipality and other retail public 
consumers.30 The various state court decisions dealt with all areas of utility service.31 The 
following survey of cases reveals a common law policy in favor of discrimination where 
there is a public interest involved.32 
1. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Rights of Consumers 
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Hollis v. Kutz, that utility rate 
discrimination in favor of the Federal Government did not violate any personal rights.33 
Earlier, in Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., the Court held that gas rates favoring New 
York City were not illegally discriminatory.34 
2. Early Common Law Decisions on Government Discrimination 
A variety of state courts deciding the issue of whether a utility discriminates against 
consumers have upheld a charitable and governmental exception.35 The Michigan 
Supreme Court upheld a Public Utilities Commission decision to allow discrimination in 
water rates for the city of Detroit.36 The Court reasoned that water used by the city is for 
the benefit of the general public.37 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals upheld 
telephone rate discrimination in favor of New York City.38 The Maine Supreme Court 
agreed with the New York Court of Appeals that discriminations in favor of the public in 
general are not opposed to public policy.39 Next, the Washington Supreme Court held 
that a city owning its own waterworks has a right to furnish water free of charge for 
charitable and municipal purposes.40 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that where 
service is donated for the public good, it is not unjustly discriminatory.41 Furthermore, 
sixty years later the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a rule limiting contributions by a 
utility to charitable and civil organizations was invalid.42 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that a city supplying itself with free water is not discriminating against retail 
consumers.43 Still further, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a Public Utilities 
Commission ruling giving municipalities a preferential electric rate.44 Thus, various state 
courts have consistently upheld charitable and municipal exceptions to the rule against 
rate discrimination. 
3. Previous Ohio Decisions 
The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the common law rule in State v. Hickey.45 First, 
the Court reasoned that independent of a statute to the contrary, the right of a 
municipality to give free water for charitable purposes can not be doubted.46 The Court 
cited cases from Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington to support its 
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holding.47 In a later case, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a utility's special rate for a 
school that was lower than the rate charged for the county.48 The Court reasoned that the 
unique status and difficulties of a school district justified such discrimination.49 Although 
both cases dealt with rate discrimination to municipalities, the statutes at issue in this case 
were not discussed.50 
C. Background of the Free Service Statute, O.R.C. § 4905.34 
The Free Service Statute was enacted as part of the Utilities Act of 1911.51 The statute 
was amended in 1939 to further define an employee.52 The statute was again amended in 
1996 after the present case was initiated to once again expand free service to government 
employees.53 This statute has been at issue in the Ohio Supreme Court only once.54 
However, the Court did not interpret the statute because it decided the case without need 
of the statue as support.55 Also, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, in two opinions, 
expressly authorized a phone utility to give free service to the police force and not to 
retail customers.56 The Commission cited the Free Service Statute as expressly permitting 
such discrimination.57 Ohio Edison is the first case decided where this statute has been 
directly at issue. 
III. Statement Of The Case 
A. Statement of Facts 
Youngstown Thermal is a limited partnership formed for the purpose of providing steam 
services to the Youngstown, Ohio area.58 In the early 1980’s, Mahoning County, Ohio 
decided to build a 198,000 square foot jail in downtown Youngstown.59 Youngstown 
Thermal was interested in providing hot water, heating and cooling services to the jail, 
but did not have the system constructed at the time.60 The jail would have been the 
anchor load61 for future cooling services to other Youngstown, Ohio customers.62 Ohio 
Edison feared losing customers in Youngstown to Youngstown Thermal.63 Lengthy 
negotiations occurred between the County Commissioners and both Youngstown 
Thermal and Ohio Edison.64 On December 22, 1993, the County signed a contract with 
Ohio Edison to provide services under the normal rate as well as additional financial 
assistance.65 
B. Procedural History 
On August 23, 1993, Youngstown Thermal filed a compliant with the Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio, alleging that Ohio Edison violated several statutes regarding its 
contract for the jail.66 On February 10, 1994, the Commission concluded that even in 
specific circumstances where discriminatory rates are permitted, no public utility may 
furnish free or reduced rate services for the purpose of destroying competition.67 On April 
7, 1994, the Commission scheduled hearing dates and decided that the last sentence of the 
Prohibition Statute, prohibiting the destruction of competition, governs the Free Service 
Statute.68 On August 31, 1995, after completion of hearings, the Commission found that 
Ohio Edison had violated the law by agreeing to provide below cost service to the jail.69 
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The Commission found that the purpose and intent of providing low cost service was to 
destroy competition.70 Nevertheless, the Commission declined to impose penalties due to 
lack of prior legal precedent.71 On October 18, 1995, the Commission reaffirmed its 
August 31, 1995 decision.72 Ohio Edison appealed the Commission’s decision to the 
Ohio Supreme Court.73 
C. Ohio Supreme Court Decision 
Justice Stratton wrote the majority opinion.74 The Court first stated it would not reverse 
the Commission order unless such order was against the manifest weight of evidence.75 
However, the Court affirmed it had complete and independent power to review the 
judgment of the Commission as to questions of law.76 The main issue the Court decided 
was the interplay between the Prohibition Statute and the Free Service Statute.77 The 
Court, therefore, reviewed the case only as a question of law.78 
The Court found the Commission’s application of both statutes was in error.79 The Court 
stated that the Commission should have determined if the Free Service Statute precluded 
the Commission’s review.80 The Court held that the Free Service Statute applied in this 
case and was not subject to a prohibition against below cost utility service for the purpose 
of destroying competition.81 The Court reasoned that the list of governmental entities in 
the statute were merely examples of donees of the reduced cost utility services.82 
Consequently, a utility may grant its property for any public purpose.83 The Court then 
stated that both statutes were clear and unambiguous.84 The Court noted that even if the 
statutes were not clear, the Free Service Statute is a specific statute and would therefore 
prevail over the general Prohibition Statute.85 The Court also stated that the intent of the 
party granting reduced cost utility services is not material under the Free Service 
Statute.86 The Court concluded by instructing the General Assembly to change the statute 
if it intends to restrict anti-competitive behavior to governmental entities as well.87 
Chief Justice Moyer wrote a dissenting opinion.88 He emphasized that Ohio Edison had 
no support for their defense in the evidence of record.89 Next, he stated that the examples 
written in the statute were a discrete list of civic opportunities where a utility may 
provide reduced rate service.90 In his opinion, competitive bidding situations did not 
appear to be a designated purpose of this section.91 He stated that read together, the 
statutes were in conflict.92 He continued by stating that the Court should give the 
Commission’s decisions great weight,93 but the majority gave the Commission’s 
decisions no weight.94 He argued that the majority overlooked the spirit and policy of the 
restriction on free or reduced price services.95 When all factors were considered - history, 
language, the Commission’s analysis, and public policy - he believed the Commission’s 
decision was correct.96 Finally, he argued that if the contracts between utilities and 
municipalities were exempt, then utilities could break such contracts without threat of the 
Commission's review.97 
IV. Analysis 
A. Analysis of Statutory Construction 
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1. The Court’s Construction Upheld the Common Law Rule 
By using a rule of statutory construction, the Court determined the legislature intended to 
give public utilities the ability to destroy competition.98 A court will use the canons of 
statutory construction to interpret statutes to give the result it desires.99 The Court 
interpreted the statute to uphold the common law rule of discrimination in favor of 
municipalities.100 
The O.R.C. also contains rules of construction.101 First, when two statutes are in conflict, 
the specific statute must be read as an exception to the general statute.102 The Free 
Service Statute begins by citing other statutes that regulate a utility.103 Next, the Free 
Service Statute defines the specific circumstances when a utility may grant free or 
reduced rate services.104 It first names a public purpose.105 It then specifically names the 
Federal, State, and Local government as possible donees.106 Finally, the statute provides 
that such contracts are valid and enforceable at law.107 In contrast, the Prohibition Statute 
specifically states the categories where it would apply.108 The categories are a person, 
firm or corporation.109 A municipality is specifically not included. O.R.C. ' 4905.35 
immediately follows the Prohibition Statute and the Free Service Statute.110 This statute 
specifically includes the word locality.111 Therefore, three statutes of the same legislative 
act, when read together, define the categories of utility consumers to which they apply.112 
Thus, the legislature must have intended the Free Service Statute to be an exception.113 
The Court, in its conservative construction, gives effect to the common law in the 
statute.114 
Second, the Court upholds the common law by construing the circumstances given in the 
statute as mere examples.115 The majority construes the words "for any public purpose," 
as its plain meaning.116 By using this construction, the Court includes a jail as being a 
type of contract where a utility may give reduced rate or below cost service.117 In 
conclusion, the majority’s policy of supporting the common law was affected by their 
construction of the statutes at issue. 
2. The Court’s Construction Upholds the Policy of Free Service for Public Purposes 
The result of the Court’s decision will be to strengthen the policy of free utility services 
to municipalities. The state of Kentucky has similar statutes that allow a utility to grant 
free service to the United States and charitable institutions.118 Similarly, an exception to 
the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act allows price discrimination for charitable 
institutions.119 In an early case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
in dicta, stated that below-cost materials supplied to the Municipal Housing Commission 
were not covered by the Federal anti-discrimination act.120 Also, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that discounts to the Federal government that 
were not given to similar customers did not violate Federal anti-discrimination laws.121 
Thus, courts have upheld a policy of preferential treatment to the government. 
Two more examples of the policy of granting free services for public purposes include a 
tax deduction and an exception from unfair competition laws. First, the Ohio Public 
5
Ferren: Ohio Edison v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
Utilities Commission determined that a utility which was civic minded was able to deduct 
contributions as operating expenses.122 Such a tax deduction is usually allowed only 
where both the utility and its patrons benefit from the contribution.123 Second, the Federal 
Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair methods of competition, but the act exempts non-
profit organizations.124 Both examples support a public policy of free service for public 
purposes.  
B. Effects of the Decision on Consumers of Electric Power 
1. Effects on Retail Customers 
The decision will have negative effects on the public. First, as a result of this decision, 
customers will be forced to pay the government regulated price over the long run.125 
Also, without competition, Ohio Edison will not be subject to market forces that create 
incentives to innovate and reduce rate prices.126 
However, the benefits of upholding the policy of free service for public interest would 
outweigh any negative effects on consumers. First, whether the jail pays or the utility 
donates the power, the taxpayers will ultimately pay.127 Thus, the free service creates a 
reduced jail budget for the county. Second, by preserving a monopoly, electric service is 
guaranteed as part of Ohio Edison’s obligation to the Youngstown area.128 Furthermore, 
consumers benefit by simpler billing.129 Also, the community benefits from programs 
supported by the revenue Ohio Edison generates.130 One result of increased competition 
may be increased prices.131 With new competition, Ohio Edison would have unused 
capacity that could only be supported by service rates.132 The public would pay to 
maintain that capacity.133 Also, with various providers, reliable, quality service might 
suffer.134 Finally, by using small or new providers, service is not guaranteed as is the case 
today. In other words, there is a chance of "the lights going out."135 Thus, the benefits of 
the current environment outweigh the advantages of competition. 
2. The Effects on Municipalities 
If there is any winner from this case, it is municipalities. First, municipalities will have 
leverage in contract negotiation with utilities.136 Besides low cost, there may be 
additional incentives, such as free equipment or repair service, that would push service 
below cost.137 Second, the public will have less of a burden to support the jail through 
taxes.138 Municipal budgets will now have added resources to allocate to more beneficial 
public services. The only negative consequence will be that municipal contracts will be 
unreviewable by the Public Utilities Commission.139 Although the results of such a 
contract may be more beneficial than if it were under the Commission’s review.140 
C. The Effect of the Decision on the Policy of Competition 
1. Conditions for Competition to be Effective 
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The practical effects of this decision are that Youngstown Thermal is unable to construct 
a cooling plant and it has been effectively prevented from starting to operate.141 However, 
Youngstown Thermal may not have been a viable competitor in the first place. Three 
factors are needed for competition to be effective in the utilities' industry.142 The first 
major factor is a parity among many competitors.143 Even though a monopoly would be 
destroyed by competition, an oligopoly144 would have the same result on consumer 
rates.145 The members of the oligopoly would enjoy the same environment as the 
monopolist now enjoys.146 An example is in the airline industry where there are now 
fewer airlines than before deregulation.147 Youngstown Thermal may not have been able 
to survive in an oligopoly with Ohio Edison and other major utility providers.  
The second major factor is the absence of a dominant firm.148 If the monopolist remains 
the dominant firm in the territory, the competitors will be forced to follow to stay in 
business.149 In order to be effective, a number of equal competitors are needed.150 Ohio 
Edison would still be the dominant firm for cooling services.  
The final factor is the ease of entry and exit into the industry.151 The cost of building and 
maintaining facilities to generate power is high. In this case, Youngstown Thermal 
couldn’t even start their business without the jail contract.152 Thus, even if the Court had 
held that Ohio Edison was unable to grant free service, retail public customer prices may 
not have changed.  
2. Utilities Have Other Legal Tools to Suppress Competition 
Utilities have a variety of ways to keep startup companies from competing for customers. 
First, the entry costs of a utility are very high.153 The cost of building plants, transmission 
stations and repair services are high.154 Second, the utilities may use political pressure to 
prevent legislation from damaging their market share.155 Next, utilities could enter into 
long-term contracts with large consumers to keep startups from getting a foothold in the 
market.156 This case is an example of how a long-term contract will prevent the entry of 
competitors into a market. Also, utilities faced with the threat of competition could merge 
to create more market power,157 which would make competing even more difficult for 
start-up providers.158 Utilities may also keep prices at bare minimums until its 
competition goes out of business.159 Finally, other creative means may be available to 
suppress competition.160 Thus, charging below cost service rates to a municipality is not 
determinative of the success of competition.  
3. The Utility Environment Must Change for Competition to be Effective 
In order for competition to thrive in the utility industry, public policy must change.161 A 
number of factors would encourage consumer choices. First, the law must prohibit long-
term contracts between utilities and large customers162 because this practice locks the 
bulk of the market share for long time periods, thus disabling startups from succeeding. 
Second, more technology is needed for startups to generate, store, and transfer energy.163 
The law must create incentives for startups to compete.164 Also, public policy must create 
a competitive ideology to encourage competition.165 Finally, the law should reduce 
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territorial laws in order to facilitate the transfer of energy across borders.166 If these 
factors are implemented, there is a better chance of reducing service rates than there is 
prohibiting reduced rates for charitable or governmental purposes.167 
V. Conclusion 
The promotion of competition is a noble cause that is heavily advocated. This Note 
stands for the proposition that the benefits of competition must be achieved without the 
need to eliminate the charitable and municipal exception to rate discrimination. Besides 
the benefits to the public interest, utilities have other ways to sustain their monopolies. 
One of the biggest factors is the access to large customers by start-up competition. 
Youngstown Thermal was denied access to what it considered to be a large customer. 
Youngstown Thermal must be given access to other customers in the Youngstown area in 
order to become a valid competitor. The legislature, regulators and the courts must work 
together to change the environment in which the public utilities now operate. 
John E. Farren 
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1 Ohio Edison v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 678 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio 1997). 
2 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Title 49 Public Utilities (Banks-Baldwin 
1997). 
3 Two statutes give the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio the power 
to oversee the utility industry in Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
(4901.02 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) which states in particular; "The 
commission shall possess the powers and duties specified in, as well as 
all the powers necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of 
Chapters 4901., 4903., 4905., 4907., 4909., 4921., and 4923. of the 
Revised Code." Id. See also Irwin S. Rosenbaum, Legislative History of 
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 3 U. CIN. L. REV. 138, 139-64 
(1929). The author traces the historical development of the Ohio Public 
Utilities Commission as a solution to the unstructured Railroad 
Commission. Id. The new agency was empowered to regulate new inventions 
as they became available to the public. Id. He outlines various laws 
that were enacted empowering the Commission in Ohio. Id. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. (4905.04 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). The statute empowers the 
Commission to regulate public utilities and railroads and to require 
all public utilities to furnish their products and render all services 
exacted by the Commission or by law. Id. See also Jeffrey W. Knapp, 
Comment, Effective State Regulation of Energy Utility Diversification, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1679-85 (1988). The author sees a problem with 
public utilities diversifying into other businesses. Id. He suggests 
that the Utilities Commissions at state levels are the most appropriate 
agency for regulations. Id. The Federal government should only step in 
if there is an emergency. Id. 
4 678 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio 1997). 
5 See id. 
6 See infra Part IV. 
7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (4905.33 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("Prohibition 
Statute"). The statute reads: 
No public utility shall directly or indirectly, or by any special rate, 
rebate, drawback, or other device or method, charge, demand, collect, 
or receive from any person, firm, or corporation a greater or lesser 
compensation for any services rendered, or to be rendered, except as 
provided in Chapters 4901., 4903., 4905., 4907., 4909., 4921., 4923., 
and 4925. of the Revised Code, than it charges, demands, collects, or 
receives from any other person, firm, or corporation for doing a like 
and contemporaneous service under substantially the same circumstances 
and conditions. No public utility shall furnish free service or service 
for less than actual cost for the purpose of destroying competition.  
Id. 
8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (4905.34 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("Free Service 
Statute"). Prior to its amendment in 1996, the statute read: 
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Chapters 4901., 4903., 4905., 4907., 4909., 4921., and 4923. of the 
Revised Code do not prevent any public utility or railroad from 
granting any of its property for any public purpose, or granting 
reduced rates or free service of any kind to the United States, to the 
state or any political subdivision of the state, for charitable 
purposes, its fairs or expositions, or to any officer or employee of 
such public utility or railroad or his family. All contracts and 
agreements made or entered into by such utility or railroad for such 
use, reduced rates or free service are valid and enforceable at law. As 
used in this section, 'employee' includes furloughed, pensioned, and 
superannuated employees.  
Id. 
9 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 788 (1917) (stating that the policy of the statute 
is that free service to a municipality does not discriminate against 
the public because the municipality represents the public interest). 
See also 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities §113 (citing many of the cases 
in this Note as authority for a utility giving away free service to the 
government or a charity). 
10 78 O. JUR. 3D Public Utilities §91 (interpreting legislative policy 
such that a public utility should not be permitted to leverage its 
rates for the purpose of destroying competition). 
11 Ohio Edison v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 678 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio 
1997). 
12 See infra Part IV.  
13 See infra Part II. C. 
14 See infra Part II. A. 
15 See infra Part II. B. 
16 See infra Part III and Part IV. 
17 See infra Part IV. C. 
18 See David C. Hjelmelt, Retail Competition in the Electric Utility 
Industry, 60 DENV. L. J. 1 (1982). The author discusses how  
economists have viewed the utility industry. Id. at 3. A natural 
monopoly occurs where even if there would be numerous competitors, 
conditions would result in only a few or one dominant supplier. Id. 
Thus, market forces themselves would tend to create a monopoly. Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Janal M. Kalis, The Role of Antitrust Law in Promoting Competition 
in Electricity Generation and Transmission, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 287, 295 (1991) (stating that because a utility is a 
10
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monopoly, the government is the only way to protect consumer 
interests). 
21 Id. at 295-96. The author describes government regulation of the 
utilities' industry as "quasi-competitive." Id. The effect of 
regulation is to artificially impose market forces on a utility without 
having market conditions. Id. The effect hoped for is decreased prices 
and increased innovation. Id. 
22 John Wyeth Griggs, Competitive Bidding and Independent Power  
Producers: Is Deregulation Coming to the Electric Utility Industry?, 9 
ENERGY L. J. 415, 427 (1988). A "Quasi-public" entity is one where the 
public entrusts the entity with essential public services for which 
they are granted legal monopolies. Id. In exchange, the entity is 
obligated to provide the public with its services. Id. An example would 
be free electrical power for street lights. Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Floyd L. Norton IV & Mark R. Spivak, The Wholesale Service 
Obligation of Electric Utility, 62 ENERGY L. J. 179, 180 (1985). The 
authors state three factors of a utility's duty:  
(1) A duty to serve in a safe and adequate manner all those qualified 
to receive service in a particular area.  
(2) An obligation to maintain reasonable rates for service.  
(3) The utility's right to serve and be protected in its service area 
from unwarranted competition of the same kind. 
Id. 
26 Id. at 181. The authors list the responsibilities of a public 
utility:  
(1) Obligation to serve all within an area who request service.  
(2) The obligation to provide service at a reasonable rate.  
(3) The obligation to serve the public without discrimination.  
(4) The obligation to provide service on reasonable terms and 
conditions. 
Id.  
27 Id. 
11
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28 Id. Additional privileges include:  
(1) The right to charge a reasonable rate.  
(2) The right to attach reasonable conditions of service.  
(3) The right to eminent domain. 
29 Id. 
30 See infra Part II. C. 
31 See infra Part II. C.  
32 64 AM. JUR. 2d Public Utilities §113. 
33 Hollis v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452 (1921). This case involved a utility 
raising the rates of ratial consumers while keeping the rate for the 
Federal Government the same. Id. at 452. The court reasoned that a 
retail utility customer may just elect not to use the service if they 
feel their rights are violated. Id. at 454-55. The plaintiff had no 
right to equity with the Federal Government. Id. 
34 Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas, 212 U.S. 19 (1909). This case involved a 
suit by shareholders against a utility to increase the rate of return. 
One of the issues was free service to New York City. Id. at 23-40. The 
Court ultimately held that a customer may not sue to require a higher 
return on the assets of a utility. Id. at 52-55. The court stated that 
a rate inquiry was not material to the reasonableness of the utility's 
rate of return. Id. 
35 See infra Part II. A. 2. 
36 See Preston v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs of Detroit, 76 N.W. 92 (Mich. 
1898). The court reasoned that the rates the city would pay would in 
turn become a tax on the same citizens that claim discrimination. Id. 
at 94. The court emphasized the discrimination applies only to 
institutions where the public does not have an interest. Id. at 96. 
37 See id. 
38 New York Tel. Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 96 N.E. 109 (N.Y. 1911). The 
court stated that unreasonable discrimination rests on public policy. 
Id. at 112. The court stated: 
Discriminations, however, in favor of the public are not opposed to 
public policy, because they benefit the people generally by relieving 
them of part of their burdens. In the absence of legislation upon the 
subject, such discriminations cannot be held illegal, as a matter of 
law, without overturning the foundation upon which the rule itself is 
built. 
Id. 
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39 City of Belfast v. Belfast Water Co., 98 A. 738 (Me. 1916). The 
court cited the reasoning of New York Telephone Co. in upholding a 
contract for free water to the city of Belfast. Id. at 742. 
40 Twitchell v. City of Spokane, 104 P. 150, 151 (Wash. 1909) 
(reasoning that although the city must charge a higher rate to its 
regular customers, the rate is not a tax because it results in the 
price that the community must nevertheless pay for water service). 
41 Fretz v. City of Edmond, 168 P. 800 (Okla. 1916), reh'g denied, 
(1917) (citing as support, Wilcox, 212 U.S. 19 (1909); New York Tel. 
Co., 96 N.E. 109 (N.Y. 1911); Twitchell, 104 P. 150 (Wash. 1904); 
Preston, 76 N.W. 92 (Mich. 1898)). 
42 State v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887, 893 (Okla. 1975) 
(holding that the way a utility spends its return on investment is of 
no concern to the Commission as long as the public is not prejudiced). 
43 Consolidated Ice Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 118 A. 544 (Pa. 1922). 
The court stated that just because the city supplies itself with free 
water for fire protection and to charities, it is not an abuse of 
discretion and affords its paying customers no just grounds for 
complaint. Id. at 546. 
44 Citizens Util. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 276 N.E.2d 330, 334 
(Ill. 1971) (noting that when a city gives a franchise to a utility, 
that agreement may be taken into consideration when negotiating a 
service contract). 
45 State v. Hickey, 30 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio 1940). This case involved an 
ordinance directing the city of Cleveland waterworks to furnish free 
water to a long list of charitable purposes and organizations. Id. at 
803-04. Those institutions sued to enforce the ordinance. Id. The Court 
noted there is no statute or constitutional provision inhibiting such 
discrimination. Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. The Court stated, "In harmony with such statements are a number 
of cases which hold or indicate that a municipality operating a 
waterworks possesses the power to supply water gratis to public, 
religious, educational, or charitable institutions." Id. (citing as 
support; Twitchell, 104 P. at 150; Consolidated Ice Co. 118 A. at 544; 
Fretz 168 P. at 800). 
48 County Comm'rs Assoc. of Ohio v. Pub. Util. Comm'r, 407 N.E.2d 534, 
536 (Ohio 1980). The Court reasoned that the Commissioner's decision 
was not unreasonable or unjustly prejudicial. Id. 
49 See id. at 537. The court reasoned that the differences between a 
county tax system and a school system are enough to justify a lower 
rate. Id. 
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50 See Hickey, 30 N.E.2d at 802; see also County Comm'r Assoc. of Ohio, 
407 N.E.2d at 534. 
51 1911 Ohio Laws 614-72.  
52 Public Utilities Act of 1911, 614-72, amended by, OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §4905.34 (1939). 
53 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (4905.34 (West 1997) (including law 
enforcement officers living in free housing and their families). 
54 County Comm'rs Assoc. of Ohio, 407 N.E.2d at 536. The Court upheld a 
Commission finding that charging a school a reduced rate compared to 
that of the county was not a statutory violation. Id. at 536. 
55 Id. 
56 Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 1993 WL 207437 (Ohio P.U.C.) (allowing a per 
line blocking service free of charge to qualified social service 
agencies and law enforcement organizations by the telephone utilities; 
other customers would be charged for the same service). See also Re 
Chillicothe Tel. Co., 1993 WL 338813 (Ohio P.U.C.). 
57 Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 1993 WL 207437 (Ohio P.U.C.) (saying that all 
subscribers should obtain free service due to the fact that law 
enforcement receives such service is clearly contrary to prudent public 
policy and ignores express authorization in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
(4905.34. (West 1997)). 
58 Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership v. Ohio Edison Co., 163 
P.U.R.4th 471 (1995). Youngstown Thermal's business plan was to build a 
plant to generate steam that would use underground pipes. Id. at 474. 
The pipes were already in place. Id. Boilers in the plant would 
generate steam. Id. The system would also be capable of producing 
chilled water through the pipe system to the customer's facility. Id.  
59 Id. at 475. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. "Anchor load" is a term used to describe a customer account that 
would require enough steam to make the entire system economically 
feasible. Id. Without a major customer, the system would not have 
enough revenue to stay in business. Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 476-79. The county employed a third party expert to evaluate 
both a steam and electrical cooling system for the jail. The expert 
concluded that electric cooling and gas boiler heating would be the 
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most economical alternative for the facility. Youngstown Thermal 
disagreed with the study. Id. 
65 Id. at 479. The additional financial assistance included an Ohio 
Edison grant to the County of a $120,000, a zero percent loan to cover 
the cost of electrical coolers, a $140,000 assistance payment, and five 
year comprehensive repair service. Id. 
66 See Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership v. Ohio Edison Co., 1994 WL 
73507 (Ohio P.U.C.). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4905.26 (West 1997). 
This statute details the process that begins a complaint with the 
Commission. Id. 
67 See Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership v. Ohio Edison Co., 1994 WL 
73507 (Ohio P.U.C.). 
68 See Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership, v. Ohio Edison Co., 1994 
WL 175113 (Ohio P.U.C.). 
69 Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership, 163 P.U.R.4th at 494-95.  
The Commission calculated that there was below cost service based total 
usage and rates from testimony at the hearings on the allegations. Id. 
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4903.02 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
70 Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership, 163 P.U.R.4th at 496-98. The 
Commission used the testimony from the hearing on the allegations to 
decide if there was intent to destroy competition. Id.. See also 
Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993). The Court 
applied a test to determine if conduct destroys competition under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §2 (1997):  
(1) The defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct 
with, 
(2) A specific intent to monopolize, and 
(3) A dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. 
Id. The Court stated that unfair or predatory conduct would be 
sufficient to prove the necessary intent. The policy behind the test is 
that the Court should be cautious not to "chill" competition rather 
than foster it. See also State ex rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe-Line 
Co., 56 N.E. 464 (Ohio 1900) (holding that that the legislature may 
prohibit contracts that hurt the public in general, but Defendant's 
contract destroyed competition in the oil industry). 
71 Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership, 163 P.U.R.4th at 500. 
72 See Youngstown Thermal, Ltd. Partnership v. Ohio Edison Co., 165 
P.U.R.4th 135, 135 (1995). 
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73 Ohio Edison v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 678 N.E.2d 922 (Ohio 
1997). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4903.12 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("No 
court other than the supreme court shall have power to review, suspend, 
or delay any order made by the public utilities commission...."). 
74 Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 925. 
75 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4903.13 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("A final 
order made by the public utilities commission shall be reversed, 
vacated, or modified by the supreme court on appeal, if, upon 
consideration of the record, such court is of the opinion that such 
order was unlawful or unreasonable."). See Cleveland Elec. 
Illuminating. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 666 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (Ohio 
1996), aff'd on reh'g, 669 N.E.2d 479 (Ohio 1996). The Court states the 
rules for a Supreme Court review of the Commission. Id. The dissent in 
Ohio Edison uses this case to say that the Court should give great 
weight to the Commission. Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 929-30 (Moyer, 
C.J., dissenting). See also Irwin S. Rosenbaum & D.E. Lilienthal, Court 
Review of Orders of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, 2 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 225, 225-27 (1928). The authors discuss three ways for the Supreme 
Court to review cases. First is a liberal approach where court's 
reverse only if there is abuse of discretion. Id. Second is a de novo 
review. Id. Third is a conservative approach of review of both facts 
and law. Id. 
76 See Canton Storage & Transfer Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 647 N.E.2d 
136 (Ohio 1995). The Court stated that it would not reweigh evidence or 
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on factual questions 
where there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that the 
Commission's order is not against the manifest weight of evidence. Id. 
at 140. Also, the order is not so clearly unsupported by the record as 
to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty. Id. See 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 527 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ohio 
1988) (stating that the Court does have complete and independent review 
of law). 
77 Ohio Edison v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 678 N.E.2d at 925. 
78 Id. The Court states that Ohio Revised Code is the standard for 
review. Id. It is "unlawful or unreasonable" and will not review a 
question of fact where the record contains sufficient evidence to 
support the Commission. Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See infra Part IV and accompanying text. 
83 Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 922. Also, such contracts are valid and 
enforceable at law. Id. at 926. 
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84 Id. at 927. See Time Warner AxS v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 661 N.E.2d 
1097, 1104 (Ohio 1996) ("Where the language [of a statute] ***clearly 
expresses the legislative intent, the courts need look no further."). 
Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurrence. Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d 
at 928 (Douglas, J., concurring). He found the Free Service Statute to 
be straightforward and unambiguous, emphasizing the phrase "any of its 
property for any public purpose," to be unrestrictive. Id. He noted 
that each party in the case fits the elements of the Free Service 
Statute. Id. Therefore, the plain language should have promptly ended 
any further inquiry in the case by the Commission. Id. He stated: "It 
is clear (1) that appellant is a public utility, (2) that the operation 
of the Mahoning County Jail is a public purpose, (3) that the product 
generated by appellant is property, and (4) that appellant granted, in 
writing, its property for a public purpose." Id. 
85 Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 927. The rule of statutory construction 
states that a specific statute is an exception to a general statute. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (infra note 102). 
86 Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 928 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
91 Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 928 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
92 Id. Justice Moyer stated that the Prohibition Statute prohibited a 
public utility from granting below cost utility services for the 
purpose of destroying competition. Id. Yet, he believed the majority's 
interpretation of the Free Service Statue allowed a utility to destroy 
competition in spite of a statute prohibiting the same. Id. 
93 Id. at 929. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. By deciding that OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4905.33 (Banks-Baldwin 
1997) is controlling, Justice Moyer concluded that competition is the 
overriding policy goal of the Revised Code and of the Commission. Id. 
The analysis of this Note does not support this contention. See infra 
Part IV. 
96 Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 930 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
97 Id. Without Commission review, if the municipality makes an error in 
its negotiations with a utility, the city is at the mercy of that 
utility. Id. 
17
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98 Id. at 927. 
99 See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 
395, 395-406 (1950). In this article, the author concludes that 
statutory construction is a tool for a judge to get the result he 
wants. Id. The author details 56 equal and opposite construction 
methods used by courts. Id. The canon used by the dissent in this case 
was, "Expressions of one thing exclude another." Ohio Edison, 678 
N.E.2d at 929 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). The majority used the exact 
opposite canon, "The language may fairly comprehend many different 
cases where some only are expressly mentioned by way of example." Id. 
at 927. Llewellyn would conclude that the majority used this canon as a 
reason why their policy should be upheld by the case. See Llewellyn, 
supra, at 395-406. 
100 See supra Part II. A. By using this method, it construed the 
statute as not discriminatory according to the common law. 
101 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1.49 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) The statute states: 
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of 
the legislature, may consider among other matters: 
a) The object sought to be attained; 
b) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted; 
c) The legislative history; 
d) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon 
the same or similar subjects; 
e) The consequences of a particular construction; 
f) The administrative construction of statutes.  
Id.  
102 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1.51 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) The Statute Reads:  
Special or Local Provision Prevails Over General; Exception. 
If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, 
they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. 
If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special 
or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, 
unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest 
intent is that the general prevision prevail. 
Id. See also City of Springdale v. CSX Railway Corp., 627 N.E.2d 534, 
538 (Ohio 1994); Thrumbull County Bd. of Health v. Snyder, 658 N.E.2d 
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783, 785 (Ohio 1996) (supporting the construction of specific controls 
over general statutes). 
103 See A&B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Bd. of Ravenna Township Trustees, 
596 N.E.2d 423, 425-26 (Ohio 1992) (defining a public utility as 
question of law based on the nature and examination of the business; 
Ohio Edison is undoubtedly a public utility). 
104 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4905.34 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
105 See Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 868 (Ohio 1969). 
Public purpose is defined by the legislative body of a municipality 
subject to review of the courts. Id. 
106 See Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 
271 (6th Cir. 1990) (defining a political subdivision as something that 
is given power by statutory authority). See also Wissel v. Ohio High 
School Athletic Assoc., 605 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (using 
same test). 
107 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1405.34 (Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
108 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
109 The majority and concurrence both use the plain language definition 
for each category. Ohio Edison v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 678 N.E.2d 
922, 926-28 (Ohio 1997). 
110 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Title 49 Public Utilities (Banks-Baldwin 
1997). 
111 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4905.35(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("No 
public utility shall make or give any undue or unreasonable preference 
or advantage to any person, firm, corporation, or locality, or subject 
any person, firm, corporation, or locality to any undue or unreasonable 
prejudice or disadvantage.") (emphasis added). 
112 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4905.33, §4905.34 and §4905.35. 
(Banks-Baldwin 1997). 
113 No legislative history is available for these statutes. 
114 See Llewellyn, supra note 99. The author states that the courts 
interpret a statute to give effect to its own policy determination. Id. 
at 395. 
115 Ohio Edison v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 678 N.E.2d 922, 927 (Ohio 
1997). 
116 Id.  
117 Id. In contrast, Justice Moyer's dissent characterized these 
circumstances as excluding all others except those specifically stated. 
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Id. at 929-30 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). Such a construction gives 
support for his policy against anti-competitive behavior. Id. Justice 
Moyer supports his policy with precedent that prohibits utilities form 
engaging in price discrimination between similar customers. Id. The 
interpretive maxim is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Id. See 
also State ex rel Celebrezze v. Nat'l. Lime & Stone Co., 627 N.E.2d 
538, 542 (Ohio 1994); Vincent v. Zanesville Civ. Serv. Comm'n., 560 
N.E.2d 226, 229 (Ohio 1990). The Chief Justice argues this same spirit 
and public policy would not allow a utility to destroy competition. 
Ohio Edison, 678 N.E.2d at 930 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). On the other 
hand, the spirit and policy of the common law would override the need 
to develop competition because the public utility costs are of a 
greater benefit than increased competition. Id. See supra Part II. A. 
See also Llewellyn, supra note 99. The author gives the exact opposite 
and equally correct construction than that of Justice Moyer. Id. at 
395. 
118 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §278.170(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("Any utility 
may grant free or reduced rate service to the United States, to 
charitable and eleemosynary institutions."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§278.170(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) ("A utility may grant free service or 
reduced rate service for the purpose of fighting fires, to any city, 
county, urban-county."). 
119 15 U.S.C.A. §13c (West 1997) ("Nothing in the Act approved June 19, 
1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, shall apply 
to purchases of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable 
institutions not operated for profit."). 
120 See Gen. Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th 
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). In this case, a 
subcontractor underbid below cost product to a general contractor 
building low income housing for the government. Id. 
121 See Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 
632 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1980). 
122 See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Charitable Contributions by Public Utility 
as Part of Operating Expenses, 59 A.L.R.3d 94 (1975). 
123 See id. 
124 See Bazil Facchina ET AL., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by 
Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F.L. REV. 85, 105-06 (1993) (setting 
out numerous examples of benefits to non-profit organizations). 
125 See Lori A. Burkhart, Electric Industry Splits Over National Choice 
Bill, 134 NO. 16 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 37, 37-38 (1996) (arguing that if 
consumers were given choices among utility suppliers, rates would 
decrease by 43%). See Griggs, supra note 22, at 427-28 (proposing that 
deregulation will decrease rates and promote efficiency). 
126 William G. Shepard, Dim Prospects: Effective Competition in 
Telecommunications, Railroads, and Electricity, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 151, 
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169 (1997). The author discusses how innovation and advances in 
technology would be a way for small startups to compete. Id. 
127 See 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Works §37 (1972). The policy requires 
competitive bidding because the public is interested in the outcome. In 
the present case the public is interested in a lower rate for the jail. 
Id. 
128 See Norton & Spivak, supra note 25, at 180-83. 
129 Linda Jones, Electric Industry Restructuring - Consumers will soon 
Choose Electric Supplier, 40 ADVOC. 30, 33 (June 1997). The author 
argues that consumers will be alarmed if they find out what makes up 
their utility bill. Id. 
130 Id. Jones also contemplates the fate of social programs funded by 
tax revenues from public utilities. Id. 
131 See Lee A. Rau, Open Access in the Power Industry: Competition, 
Cooperation, and Policy Dilemmas, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 279, 279-83 
(1996). The author argues that if competition takes over, costs of new 
construction will need to be recovered in higher rates. Id. Also, any 
savings may only benefit a certain group and may not benefit ultimate 
consumers. Id. 
132 James I. Serota, Increasing Competition in the Electric Utility 
Industry and Decreasing Consumer Welfare: An Antitrust Paradox, 64 
ANTITRUST L. J. 303, 304 (1996). The first paradox the author states is 
when the there is a number of competitors, the utility still has a duty 
to provide. Id. In order to accomplish this, they would purchase excess 
capacity and store it for emergencies. These purchasing costs would 
have to be borne by the rate payers. Id. Thus, competition would 
increase rates. Id. 
133 See id. at 303-10. 
134 Id. The second paradox the author describes occurs when a customer 
chooses one supplier, the second supplier must still have excess 
capacity in case of emergencies. Id. A utility under regulation is 
forbidden to refuse to service a customer. Id. Under competitive 
circumstances, customers may not have reliable sources of backup which 
would risk service quality. Id. 
135 See id. 
136 See supra Part III. A. 
137 See Serota, supra note 132, at 303-10. 
138 See supra note 127. Where tax dollars are concerned, there is 
policy to achieve the lowest contract through competitive bidding. Id. 
139 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. Without some mechanism for 
reviewing a contract between municipalities and utilities, there is no 
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recourse if there is a problem. Id. Also, terms may not always be 
favorable to a municipality. Id. 
140 See supra Part III. A. If the contract was under Commission review, 
provisions beneficial to a municipality may not be acceptable.  
141 See supra Part III. A. 
142 See Shepard, supra note 126, at 154. The author details what 
environment is necessary for competition in the utility industry to 
survive. Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, And Antitrust Law, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 443-44 (1982). An oligopoly is were a few 
companies have a majority of business in a given market. Id. They hold 
enough market power to charge a higher price than if there were more 
competition but would lose market share if their price was raised. Id. 
Thus, a firm is a price taker such that it has high profits but is not 
a market maker such that it may not charge a higher price. Id. See also 
Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly And The Antitrust Laws: A Suggested 
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566 (1969) (a theory of oligopoly 
behavior is that no participant will reduce prices because it will 
cause all other participants to match the change negating the 
advantage). 
145 See Douglas Gagax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric 
Utility Industry: An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 80-87 (1993). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. The authors state that deregulation does not necessarily mean 
competition. Id. As an example, they use the airline industry that has 
fewer airlines in operation than it did in 1978 before deregulation. 
Id. 
148 See Shepard, supra note 126, at 155. 
149 Id.  
150 See Hay, supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
151 See Shepard, supra note 126, at 155. 
152 See supra Part III. A. 
153 See Shepard, supra note 126, at 158. As part of the needs of 
competition, for a competitor to even enter the industry, a large 
capital downpayment is needed to build facilities. Id. See also infra 
note 155. Shepard states that entry requires a substantial sunk cost. 
Shepard, supra note 126, at 158. A sunk cost is defined as capital 
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outlays needed to make a business operate that may not be recovered if 
the business is sold. Id. 
154 See id. The risk of being unable to dispose of facilities in case 
of financial failure is high. Id. 
155 See Sam Randazzo (Mailbag), Why We Sign Those Secret Deals, 135 NO. 
8 PUB UTIL. FORT. 12 (1997). The author writes that Ohio is a state 
that is critical of secret deals between utilities and customers for 
long-term contracts. Id. However, political pressure by the utility 
industry has hampered the effort. Id. He indicates that the environment 
will not change unless customers are given the tools to change it. Id. 
156 See Shepard, supra note 126, at 153. The author notes that dominant 
firms constantly think ahead so as to create barriers to competition. 
Id. One of the barriers is to lock in major customers with long-term 
contracts. Id. 
157 See Serota, supra note 132, at 303-10. The author also states that 
utilities will think ahead. Id. He believes that utilities faced with 
competition will combine and pool their resources into regional or 
national giants. He believes that as competition increases, the 
industry will get away from regional or state markets and move towards 
national or global markets. Id. 
158 See id. 
159 See James A. Orr & Barrett K. Hawks, Case Studies in Electric 
Utility Competition Litigation, 8 NAT'L RESOURCES & ENV'T 29, 58 
(1994). The authors detail various cases where a utility used various 
cash or service incentives to reduce costs to certain customers while 
keeping overall rates high. Id. 
160 See Douglas G. Green & J. A. Bouknight Jr., Electric Utility 
Antitrust Issues in an Era of Bulk Power Market Competition, 8 NAT'L 
RESOURCES & ENV'T 20, 53 (1994). The authors note the utilities will 
block competition with contracts. Id. Such tactics would probably 
comply with anti-competition laws because they are in response to 
competition. Id. They predict the use of Antitrust laws to break 
utility monopolies. Id. 
161 See Hjelmfelt, supra note 18, at 12. The author suggests various 
policy and regulation changes that would promote competition. Id. They 
include new territorial laws, forcing utilities to open transmission 
stations to competition, and to get legislators, regulators, and courts 
to recognize that regulation is not a substitute for competition. Id. 
162 See Shepard, supra note 126, at 169. The author states that a major 
barrier to competition is secret long-term contracts. He recommends 
ways to stop such discounts including: 
(1) Voiding all existing long-term contracts. 
(2) Prohibiting future long-term contracts. 
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(3) Limiting contracts to one year. 
(4) Requiring full disclosures of discounts to large customers.  
Id. 
163 Philip R. O'Connor ET AL., The Transition to Competition in the 
Electric Utility Industry, 8 ENERGY L. & POL'Y 223, 229 (1988). The 
authors indicate that improvements in transmission technology will 
enable utilities to move energy across great distances thereby 
expanding the marketplace. Id. Other improvements include the ability 
to allow large customers to generate their own electricity. Id. The 
result is that new technology will make competition financially 
feasible. Id 
164 See Hjelmfelt, supra note 18, at 15. 
165 O'Connor, supra note 163, at 230. Another barrier the authors 
discuss is the ideology of the industry. Id. They suggest that in order 
for competition to survive, the government, consumers and the industry 
must realize that regulation accomplishes little for the public 
interest. Id. 
166 See Hjelmfelt, supra note 18, at 15. The author states that state 
bounties make competition difficult. Id. 
167 See William J. Collins, Electric Utility Rate Regulation: Curing 
Economic Shortcomings Through Competition, 19 TULSA L. J. 141, 164-84 
(1983). The author recommends changing regulations to promote 
competition. Id. He suggests competition will solve problems of the 
utility industry. Id. 
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